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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXPLOSION:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS,
DETERMINANTS AND IMPACTS
By MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK,* DONALD N. DEWEES** AND
DAVID G. DUFF***
[This article briefly describes trends in the frequency and severity ofmedical malpractice claims
in Canada and the U.S., with some comparative references to trends in Britain and Australia. In all
cases, frequency and severity rates appear to have risen quite dramatically over the past decade and
a half. The article proceeds to explore various hypotheses that might explain these trends. While
empirical analysis does not yield firm conclusions, the fact that so many jurisdictions have
experienced a somewhat similar phenomenon makes it doubtful that the primary cause ofthe increase
is likely to be idiosyncratic features of one particular country's tort system. Instead, the authors
conjecture that various changes in medical technology may well be a more important explanatory
factor. The article goes on to examine the empirical evidence on the impact ofexpanding liability on
physician behaviour and in turn whether observed changes in physician behaviour have caused
reductions in the medical injury rate. While it seems clear from the evidence that the liability system
has 'induced various changes in physician behaviour, it is much less clear whether these changes
have reduced the medical injury rate or are otherwise socially desirable.]
I INTRODUCTION
The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a dramatic increase in the frequency and
severity of medical malpractice claims in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. This
phenomenon has provoked a perception in many quarters of a medical malprac-
tice crisis, and has precipitated major tort law reforms at the state level in the
U.S. aimed at containing the crisis.' A strikingly divergent view, on the other
hand, suggests that this phenomenon merely reflects a reduction in some of the
slack in the medical malpractice system in which previously a very high
proportion of negligently caused iatrogenic injuries did not result in suits. To the
extent that there is a medical malpractice crisis, those who adopt thesecond view
assert that the real crisis continues to be not too many claims but too few claims
to achieve optimal deterrence of substandard health care and compensation of
victims. 2
We see two linkages between medical malpractice litigation and technological
development. On the one hand, advances in medical practice and technology
may, by increasing the frequency with which a patient's life or health depends on
split-second judgments or actions by the physician, increase the opportunity for
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) Danzon, P. M., Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and,Public Policy, 1985; Weiler, P.,
Legal Policy for Medical Injuries, 1988, Harvard Law School, Mimeo.
2 Abel, R. L., 'The Real Tort Crisis - Too Few Claims' (1987) 48 Ohio State Law Journal 443.
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medical malpractice litigation in the event of physician error. On the other hand,
liability for losses arising from events of malpractice" creates incentives to
develop technology that reduces risks and losses, including technology that is
more forgiving of momentary acts of inadvertence. Both linkages are explored
below.
In this essay, we briefly review comparative trends in malpractice liability
over the past decade or so in the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and Australia (section
IT). Then drawing on a recent empirical study of the Canadian experience which
we have undertaken," we examine various hypotheses as to the determinants of
these trends (section lll). We believe that the fact that rates of 'malpractice
litigation in the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and, apparently, Australia, have all
grown rapidly in recent years suggests caution in seeking explanations exclu-
sively or even primarily in doctrinal nuances peculiar to a particular jurisdiction,
and requires us to take more seriously than has often hitherto been the case
various non-legal explanatory factors which we canvass below. In particular, two
sets of these non-legal factors - hypothesized cultural changes in attitudes to
risk-bearing, and the response of the tort system to errors which manifest
themselves in periods of rapid technological innovation - if supported by the
empirical evidence, would have direct and significant implications for the impact
of the tort system on rates of innovation and technological change in the health
care system. _
After reviewing the empirical evidence on trends in medical malpractice
liability and determinants thereof, we survey the existing empirical evidence on
the impact of the medical malpractice system on physician behaviour, indicating
some of the analytical complexities that must be confronted in making normative
judgments about these tort-induced changes (section IV). Notwithstanding the
ambiguous evidence on the welfare effects of the present medical malpractice
system, however, the empirical evidence also suggests that alternative quality
control mechanisms in place for addressing post-entry negligence and incompe-
tence of physicians - principally the disciplinary mechanisms of the self-
regulating institutions of the medical profession - seem poorly adapted to
perform this role. In the concluding section of the paper (section V), we review
this evidence and also briefly evaluate claims for preserving a significant role for
the tort system as a quality control mechanism, but with a redirected focus on
institutional 'gatekeepers', principally hospitals.
IT GENERAL TRENDS
Following a period of minimal malpractice litigation in the 1940s and 1950s in
Canada, claims filings and payments began to grow in the mid-1960s. Between
1971 and 1988, the average compound annual growth rate in claims filed per 100
CMPA4 member physicians in Canada was about 8.2 per cent, implying almost a
3 Dewees, D" Coyte, P., and Trebilcock,M., Canadian Medical Malpractice Liability: An
Empirical Analysis ofRecent Trends, Study for Federal-Provincial Task Force on Medical Liability,
September 1989. ,
4 The Canadian Medical Protective Association (C.M.P.A.) is a physicians' mutual that provides
coverage for over 90 per cent of all physicians in active practice in Canada.
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quadrupling in the claims frequency rate over this period (see Table 1). Between
1971 and 1988, the number of claims paid per 100 physicians grew at an average
compound annual growth rate of 6.1 per cent, implying somewhat less than a
trebling in the paid claim frequency rate over this period. Between 1970 and
1985, the growth rate in frequency of claims in the U.S. is quite similar to that in
Canada. Danzon estimated a 10 per cent annual growth rate in U.S. claims
Table 1 Writs and Claims per 100 Physicians
Canada!
Writs Claims
Filed Paid
(1) (2)
United States
Claims
Filed 2 ,
(3)
Ratio?
(3)/(1)
(4)
Canada
Writs Filed
Per Real 1981
Billion $'s Billed
1 The number of writs filed and claims paid is obtained from the C.M.P.A. The number of
physicians is the membership of the Canadian Medical Protective Association. The population per
active civilian physician in Canada, excluding interns and residents, has fallen from 79 I to 542
between 1971 and 1987, so the writ frequency per 100,000 population has increased from 0.6 to 3.5.
2 These figures are derived from SI. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the leading U.S.
underwriter of malpractice insurance.
3 In the U.S. there is one claim per physician, while in Canada there is one claim per accident,
frequently with multiple defendants. Thus while the U.S. has 8-10 times as many claims, there are
probably only 5 times as many litigated medical injuries in the U.S. as in Canada.
4 Danzon, P., reports the number of claims pending per 100 physicians. This figure overstates the
claim frequency in 1970 since it includes both the claims filed in that year as well as the unresolved
claims filed in prior years: Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (1985) 60.
5 Danzon, P., 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence'
(1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 57, 63.
6 Danzon, P., Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (1985) 60.
7 United States General Accounting Office (1986, Table 2.5).
g Weiler, P., op. cit. (1988),7.
9 Estimated using an exponential model.
I
1
1
1
1970
1971 0.55
1972 0.60
1973 0.62
1974 0.77
1975 0.77
1976 0.76
1977 0.85
1978 1.00
1979 1.03
1980 1.31
1981 1.42
1982 1.38
1983 1.55
1984 1.60
1985 2.13
1986 1.84
1987 1.81
1988 1.70
Growth rate?
8.2%
8.2
0.21·
0.22
0.13
0.23
0.17 7.05 9.1
0.23 63.6
0.22 7.5 6 8.8 71.5
0.25 82.5
0.33 83.9
0.38 10.67 8.1 104.5
0.39 11.47 8.0 113.2
0.41 13.37 9.6 109.2
0.53 15.17 9.7 124.0
0.32 16.57 10.3 127.2
0.36 17.88 8.4 175.6
0.46
0.41
0.39
6.1%
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Table 2 Average Value of Paid Writs and Claims (Thousands of Dollars)
Canada' United States 2 Ratio
Average Paid Claims Average Paid Claims (4)/(2)
Current $ 1987 $ Current U.S. $ 1987CDN$
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1970 11.53 44.8
1971 8.0 26.2
1972 5.5 17.2
1973 9.0 26.2
1974 13.4 3~.1
1975 18.5 43.7 26.64 75.1 1.72
1976 37.5 82.5 26.74 71.4 0.87
1977 33.4 68.0 34.84 87.3 1.28
1978 15.0 27.9 45.24 105.3 3.77
1979 48.4 82.8
1980 27.1 42.1 33.65 61.9 1.47
1981 38.2 52.8 49.3 82.4 1.56
1982 38.9 48.6 61.5 96.8 1.99
1983 53.5 63.1 70.4 107.4 1.70
1984 101.4 114.6 83.4 122.0 1.06
1985 91.9 99.9 88.3 126.8 1.27
1986 80.2 83.7 95.7 132.6 1.58
1987 117.2 117.2
1988 126.3 121.4
Growth Rate"
18.3% 9.5%
1 Average paid claims are obtained from Dewees, COyleand Trebilcock, supra n. 3, Table 2-3,
while the Consumer Price Index, derived from the Bank of Canada Review, various issues, was
employed to convert the paid claims into 1987 dollars.
2 The U.S. consumer price index was used to convert the U.S. dollars in column 3 to 1987 U.S.
dollars. The Canada-U .S. exchange rate, derived from the Bank ofCanada Review, was employed to
convert 1987 U.S. dollars to Canadian dollars.
3 Danzon, P. M., Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy. 1985, lSI.
4 National Association of Insurance Commissions (1980).' .
5 1980-1986 data from Sloan, F. and Borbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Crisis, Response and
Effects (1989) 8.
6 Estimated by an exponential model. Estimation for columns I and 2 over the period 1976-87
produced growth rates of 15.0 per cent and 6.3 per cent, respectively.
frequency between 1976 and 1984.5 However, the average frequency of claims
filed against physicians in the U.S. is about five times greater than in Canada.
With respectto severity, the Canadian data indicates a four-fold increase in the
average malpractice claim payment in real terms between 1971 and 1988-a9.5
per cent per year compounded annual rate of increase. (See Table 2.) Again, the
5 Danzon, P.M., The 'Crisis' in Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of Trends in the United
States, Canada. the United Kingdom and Australia, 1989, University of Pennsylvania, Mimeo.
.T~j::
ii'
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Table 3 Malpractice Litigation Trends in the U.K. 111i-,
I
Claims
I,
Average Maximum Defence
I'Opened l Award2 Award3 Society -.
RegionE Rates4 i
(Claims per (1976=100) (£ 000) . (£) I
I
Year 100,000 pop.) I!t
1976 100
1977 110 133
1978 4.0 140 229 40
1979 4.1 105 220 70
1980 4.2 200 263 95
1981 5.1 230 312 120
1982· 5.3 360 399 135
1983 7.5 280 195
1984 9.3 370 264
1985 12.3 420 414 288
1986 16.5 581 336
1987 20.4 679 576
1988 19.6 1030 1080
All data from Ham, C., Dingwall, R., Fenn, P., Harris, D., Medical Negligence: Compensation and
Accountability, 1988. All financial data are in current pounds; that is, there is no correction for
inflation in these figures.
I Ibid. Fig. 5. Claim rate for region E in England, which is the region with the highest claims
rate.
2 Ibid. Fig. 2. Average cost of settlements, from the Medical Protective Society.
3 Ibid. Fig. 3. Highest sum awarded in medical negligence cases, as reported by the Medical
Defense Union. .
4 Ibid. Table 3. Full subscription rates paid to the medical defense societies. These rates appearto
. be common to the Medical Defense Union and the Medical Protective Society.
increase in average payments in Canada and the U.S. in recent years is quite
similar, doubling between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s; Danzon reports a
growth rate of real severity of 14 per cent per year between 1980 and 1987.6
However, the absolute level of average payments in Canada has been somewhat
less than in the U.S. U.K. data on rates of growth in frequency and severity of
malpractice claims over the past decade reflect rates of increase broadly compa-
rable to those experienced in Canada and the U.S. (see Table 3), and even, in
Australia, claims frequency - at least in New South Wales - doubled between
1984 and 1986.7 U.K. frequency rates, on a population basis, appear to be
significantly higher than Canadian rates. With respect to insurance fees, the
overall compound annual rate of growth in CMPA fees, adjusted for inflation,
between 1976 and 1987 is about 14 per cent, although between 1982 and 1986,
average fees tripled in real terms and rose over 40 per cent in 1987, yielding
an average annual compound growth rate of 39 per cent between 1982 and 1987.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
I
I
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Danzon reports that U.S. insurance fees grew at an annual rate of 10 per cent
to 20 per cent in real terms between 1976 and 1987.8 However, in 1987
Canadian dollars, average malpractice fees in the U.S. appear to be about nine
times higher than in Canada, reflecting principally the much higher litigation rate
in the U.S.
The Canadian data reveal major differences in the frequency of claims among
the set of specialities that we examined. Orthopaedic surgeons, obstetricians and
gynaecologists, and anaesthetists exhibit the largest claims frequency rate, while
family practice physicians exhibit the lowest 'frequency. On the other hand,
differences in the median award amongst these specialty groups appear not to be
statistically significant. In terms of total payments attributable to various specialties
relative to their proportion in the total stock of physicians, orthopaedic surgeons
are over-represented by a factor of 4.8, anaesthetists by 3.2, and obstetricians
and gynaecologists by 2:3, while family practice is under-represented by one
third.
With respect to comparisons of premium costs across various professions, in
Canada the average premiums paid for professional liability insurance as a percent-
age of average net professional income in 1985 reveal the following ratios:
Ontario lawyers - 1.46 per cent; Canadian chartered accountants- 1.28 per cent;
CMPA member physicians - 1.02 per cent; Ontario dentists - 0.21 per cent.
Thus, the average premium-to-income ratio for Canadian physicians does not
seem to be sharply different from that of other professions, although premium
expenses for certain high risk medical specialties, such as anaesthesia and
obstetrics, reflect much higher ratios.
ill DETERMINANTS OF TRENDS IN THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
To test various hypotheses that might explain the above general trends, we
examined, in semi-aggregate form, all open and closed claims data from the
CMPA for the period 1976 to 1987, and analysed in detail 107 large paid claims
that were closed in this period (a large claim being defmed as entailing a payment
in excess of $100,000 in 1976 dollars adjusted upwards in subsequent years for
inflation). As to explanations for these trends, we tested various hypotheses that
fall into three broad categories: changes in the professional environment; changes
in the social environment; and changes in the legal environment.
1. Changes in the Professional Environment
(a) Utilization ofHealth Care Services
Most of the variation in frequency across specialties can be explained by
variations in the performance of major surgery in each specialty. Utilization of
major surgery explains fully 90 per cent of the variation among years and among
8 Ibid.
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specialties in the frequency of claims filings, most of which represents variation
across specialties. Focussing on the general increase in the frequency of claims
filed over time, the seven-fold increase in the number of claims filed between
1971 and 1987 is reduced to about a four-fold increase when growth in number of
claims is related to the growth in the number of CMPA physicians. Replacing the
number of physicians with the total value of medical services provided, or with
the value of major surgical services provided, adds nothing to explaining the
increase, since the former utilization variable grew only slightly more rapidly
than the number of CMPA practising physicians over this period and the latter
variable grew substantially less rapidly.
(b) Quality ofHealth Care Professionals and Their Institutions
We found only weak support in the semi-aggregate and less in the large claims
data set for the hypothesis that domestically-trained physicians are less likely
than foreign-trained physicians to be sued. Nor did we find support for the
hypothesis that malpractice is more common among newly graduated physicians
or among older physicians. We had only a weak test of recidivism, butthis test
suggests that recidivism is not an important factor in generating the large claims
(at most three identical defendants in the 107 claims). Finally, the large claims
data reveal that large claims arise more often in large cities relative to the size of
the place of residence of the patient. This suggests that there is either a migration
of difficult cases from smaller to larger communities for treatment or, less likely,
that there is a higher rate of severe malpractice in larger centres. So too, with
respect to hospital liability, increasing urbanization also increases the frequency
of claims filed. Urbanization may be a proxy for increasing difficulty of
procedures performed at urban hospitals, or for a greater propensity to litigate
among patients of urban hospitals.
(c) The Effect ofMedical Innovation
To the extent that the data suggests a greater increase in the propensity to sue
physicians or hospitals than to initiate claims against other professionals (dis-
cussed below), the conundrum that requires explanation is how such a dramatic
increase in claim frequency could accompany rapid rates of innovation in the
provision of medical care, which presumably have reduced health-related risks to
society. Considering the central role of major surgery in explaining differences in
frequency rates across specialties, we speculate that observably serious outcomes
that can readily be attributed to discrete medical interventions (albeit sometimes
in contexts where the intervention is inherently risky) make physicians and
hospitals more prone to suit by individuals than may be the case in other
professional contexts. In this respect, it is useful to consider Grady's hypothesis?
that the law of negligence implies that in periods of rapid technological
9 Grady, M., 'Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical
Malpractice Explosion' (1988) 82 Northwestern University Law Review 293.
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innovation, which may indeed be reducing health risks for society at large, the
harm caused by momentary acts of inadvertence by physicians and other medical
staff is sharply increased and that the legal system is unforgiving of the costs
entailed in achieving consistently higher levels of advertence. He argues, for
Ji;
example, that prior to the invention of dialysis machines, patients frequently died
from kidney failure, but these natural events fell outside the purview of the tort
system. Following the invention of dialysis machines, which sharply reduced
mortality from kidney failure, inadvertence by physicians and other medical staff
in initial diagnosis as to the appropriateness of prescribing this form,of medical
intervention and in monitoring its application to particular patients thereafter led
to a great increase in physician-caused injuries, since properly administered
dialysis could now save a life. A similar thesis might be advanced with respect to
technically complex forms of surgery, such as brain surgery or open-heart
surgery, or technically complex interventions in the case of premature births,
where the potential harm caused by momentary acts of inadvertence has been
significantly multiplied.
Our data does not permit any rigorous testing of Grady's theory, although the
higher claims rates with respect to orthopaedic surgeons, obstetricians and
gynaecologists, and anaesthetists, along with the more general dominance of
major surgery as an explanatory variable for differences in frequency rates across
specialties, are consistent with his hypothesis. On the other hand, medical-
interventions in technically new and complex contexts did not account for a large
percentage of the 107 large paid claims in our survey (although surgical
procedures were involved in about half of the cases). Nevertheless, we were told
by lawyers on both sides of the malpractice litigation bar that most claims do not
arise from the general incompetence of a physician, but from a momentary lapse
by a competent practitioner. This view is supported by our inability to fmd
evidence of recidivism in the large claims data. While our data does not allow us
to prove the Grady hypothesis, therefore, it is clearly not inconsistent with it,
particularly if one interprets it as referring not just to interventions involving
sophisticated technology, but to all interventions that give rise to risks of serious
harm if a small mistake is made.
2. Changes in the Social Environment
(a) GeneraL Propensity to Litigate
We compared trends in frequency rates of claims against physicians with
trends in frequency rates of claims in other litigation contexts (see Table 4). We
found that over the past decade there have been marked increases in frequency
rates for both Ontario and non-Ontario lawyers, for Ontario dentists, and
somewhat less dramatic increases in third party bodily injury claims arising out
of automobile accidents in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. On the other
hand, claims rates for architects, engineers and chartered accountants do not
reflect any such increases. However, U.K. data with respect to architects,
accountants, and veterinary surgeons over recent years does reflect sharp
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Table 4 Claims Experience of Non-Health Professions Incident-Year Basis
Relative Claims Frequency 1982 = 100
Ontario Non-Ontario Canadian Canadian Ontario
Year Lawyers Lawyers Chart. Accts Arch. &Eng. Dentists
1976 N.A. 38.3 N.A. 102.9 53.6
1977 71.5 31.0 N.A. . 90.5 60.1
1978 115.5 45.8 N.A. 105.6 74.3
1979 123.4 56.0 N.A. 120.1 83.5
1980 147.0 53.3 144K 109.0 72.0
1981 134.1 58.5 76.6 112.4 93.9
1982 100.0 100.0 100.0 '100.0 100.0
1983 104.5 75.4 116.5 95.7 91.4
1984 122.9 99.5 116.1 79.3 191.7
1985 112.1 103.3 95.2 56.0 145.9
1986 106.7 66.4 98.0 58.1 168.6
1987 115.0 N.A. 81.7 71.9 190.8
[Numbers in recent years understate frequency rates because of unreported claims.]
Relative Severity 1982 = 100
Ontario Non-Ontario Canadian Canadian Ontario
Year Lawyers Lawyers Chart. Accts Arch. & Eng. Dentists
1976 N.A. 45.3 374.6 97.6 97.8
1977 82.1 45.1 122.4 129.7 385.8
1978 88.6 57.5 142.8 103.6 69.5
1979 78.4 82.8 48.7 105.4 83.6
1980 71.5 95.2 154.6 97.9 120.4
1981 111.6 92.6 184.1 118.3 102.4
1982 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1983 137.9 66.8 107.0 91.0 118.2
1984 125.2 75.6 61.3 83.2 65.7
1985 142.1 43.9 60.3 98.6 62.0
1986 161.2 44.6 42.0 102.4 76.4
1987 176.6 N.A. 46.2 90.4 97.0
[Numbers in recent years' may understate severity rates because of underreporting of more serious
claims.]
increases in frequency rates. In the case of architects, there was one claim for
every seven policies in 1979 and seven for every ten in 1987. Claims against
veterinary surgeons in Britain doubled between 1981 and 1987, and the real
value of paid and reserved claims against accountants increased by 82 per cent
between 1979 and 1984.10 To the extent that this comparative data suggests an
10 Ham, C., Dingwall, R., Fenn, P., Harris, D., Medical Negligence: Compensation and
Accountability, 1988,.15.
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increase in the general propensity to sue professionals, it may provide support for
recent social and political theorizing by Wildavsky and others 11 that many
persons in Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and probably other industrial societies,
exhibit an increasing reluctance to accept certain kinds of risks. In this respect,
reference is often made to the post-war growth of the welfare state, to a sharply
increased role of governments in regulating health, safety, and environmental
matters dating back to the 1960s, and in the case of the tort system, attempts to
shift risks to professional service providers (or in the product liability context..
manufacturers) who are assumed to possess the necessary technical expertise to
reduce or eliminate risk or, because of greater resources, to bear residual risks.
Increasing social distance between clients and professionals may also encour-
age greater resort to the tort system and heightened claims consciousness.
Although our data revealed no significant positive relationship between interpro-
vincial migration and immigration per capita and the frequency of malpractice
litigation, the higher frequency rates with respect to physicians practising in
urban centres and with respect to hospitals located in urban centres might be
interpreted as providing support for the social distance hypothesis.
(b) Demographic and Economic Factors
There is evidence that infants and females aged 18 to 44 win higher than
average awards, while the elderly achieve lower than average awards. Thus, an
increase in either the proportion of the population under 5 or women aged 1"8-44
raises the average paid claim, while an increase in the proportion of the
population over 65 lowers the average paid claim. However, demographic
variables appear to be unrelated to both frequency of malpractice claims and the
proportion of prod claims. Average claims severity is positively associated with
both wages and interest rates. Males are more common as plaintiffs in the large
claims, and are especially predominant among injured newborns, which may be
attributable to larger expected income losses for males, leading to larger awards,
thus leading to an increased propensity to file a claim for an injured male than for
an injured female.
3. Changes in the Legal Environment
Danzori'? has shown that in the United States, pro-plaintiff laws (covering the
abolition of the locality rule and charitable immunity, more stringent require-
ments of informed consent and respondeat superior) contributed significantly to
the growth in both the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. Adams and
ZuckermanI3 found the frequency of malpractice claims to be significantly and
positively associated both with more generous limitations periods and with
11 Akaroni; Y., The No-Risk Society, 1981. Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A., Risk and Culture,
1982; Polisar, D. and Wildavsky A., 'From Individual to System Blame: A Cultural Analysis of
Historical Changes in the Law of Torts' (1989) I Journal of Policy History 129.
12 Danzon, P. M., 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims' (1984) 27
Journal ofLaw and Economics 115, 137.
13 Adams, E. K., and Zuckerman, S., 'Variations in the Growth and Incidence of Medical
Malpractice Claims' (1984) 9 Journal ofHealth Politics. Policy and Law 475.
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restrictions on the doctrine of informed consent. Danzon 14 has found that on
average cutting one year off the statute of limitations for adults reduces claims
frequency by eight per cent ..
Danzon 15 has also examined the impact of various doctrinal changes relating to
quantum on malpractice litigation. With respect to changes in compensation
rules, she found that the introduction of laws that allow or require reductions in
awards to reflect coverage from other sources (collateral benefits) reduces
significantly both the frequency and severity of malpractice claims -frequency
by 14 per cent and severity by 11 per cent to 18 per cent relative to comparable
states without collateral source offset. 16 Danzon17 and Danzon and Lillard 18 also
found that caps on awards for non-pecuniary losses have reduced the severity of
malpractice claims by about 23 per cent on average.
In our study we found that both severity and the proportion of claims paid
respond positively to lagged dependent variables which may capture slow
expansion of liability from changes in legal doctrines. The frequency of paid
claims is positively related to both the predicted severity of claims, supporting
the hypothesis that compensation rules affect frequency, and the predicted
proportion of paid claims, supporting the hypothesis that liability rules affect
frequency. Legal variables with respect to both liability and compensation appear
to account for no more than 50 per cent in the growth in frequency of claims in
Canada since 1976 and probably less. There is evidence in the large clI1ims data
that expansion of compensation rules, including the compensation of relatives,
the use of real interest rates as discount rates, the introduction of prejudgment
interest, and gross-up for cost of care (to offset tax liability on income from
invested awards), have contributed to increases in the severity of awards.
Furthermore, more stringent requirements for informed consent are found to
increase significantly the frequency of claims filings. The increase in the size of
some awards increased the incentive to litigate some similar claims, and brought
forth additional claims that might not have been worth litigating under less
generous compensation rules. The net effect is an increase in the size of an
average award, and an increase in the frequency of litigation. We believe that
this is a significant factor in explaining the growth rates in both severity and
frequency of claims for practising physicians. However, even given these
effects, we have not attempted in this study to evaluate whether these changes in
legal doctrine are socially beneficial or not. We were not able to investigate
whether the wider availability of legal aid or contingent fees in some Canadian
jurisdictions has contributed to an increase in the rate of claims against
14 Danzon, P. M., 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims' (1984) 27
Journal of Law and Economics 115.
15 ibid.; Danzon, P. M., supra n. 1; Danzon, P. M., 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims: New Evidence' (1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 57; See also
Hughes, J. W., 'The Effect of Medical Malpractice Reform Laws on Claim Disposition', (1989) 9
International Review ofLaw and Economics 57.
16 Danzon, P. M. 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims' (1984) 27 Journal
of Law and Economics 115; Danzon, P. M. 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence' (1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 57.
17 Ibid.
18 Danzon, P. M., and Lillard, L. A., 'Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims' (1983) 12 Journal of Legal Studies 345.
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physicians or hospitals. However, we did not find support in our data for the
hypothesis that an increase in the number of practising lawyers per capita has led
to an increase in malpractice claims. .'
IV THE EFFECT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
In this section we present evidence on changes in health care delivery
attributable to the threat of malpractice liability. Because these 'outputs' alone.
tell us nothing about the ultimate impact of the civil liability system on the
incidence of medical injuries, however, we also explore the likely relationship
between these 'intermediate' responses and the medical injury rate. Finally,
since optimal deterrence requires that health care providers undertake only cost
justified reductions in the rate of medical injuries, we consider the costs of the
liability system and the relationship between these costs and the possible benefits
obtained by the medical malpractice system.
1. The Impact ofCivil Liability on Medical Practice
In theory, the civil liability system can affect the incidence of medical injuries
in two distinct ways: first, by forcing health care providers to bear the costs of all
negligently-caused injuries, it encourages them to take care to prevent the
occurrence of such injuries; second, by internalizing the costs of these injuries to
health care providers, it encourages the substitution of low-risk procedures for
high-risk procedures and the displacement of low-quality providers by high-
quality providers. We will now review the evidence on liability-induced changes
in these care and activity levels.
(a) Care Levels
(i) Individuals. Aside from anecdotal commentary, available evidence on the
impact of the civil liability system on the practice patterns of individual
physicians is threefold. First, two econometric studies in the U.S. have
found statistically significant correlations between increases in malpractice
premium levels (as a proxy for malpractice risk) and the frequency of
specific diagnostic procedures. For Greenwald and Mueller, working with
cross-sectional data by state from 1970, a 10 per cent increase in malprac-
tice premiums was associated with a 3.6 per cent increase in a weighted
average of laboratory tests, x-rays and consultations.'? Examining more
recent data from 1984, Reynolds, Rizzo and Gonzalez report an elasticity of
0.073 relating malpractice premiums and the volume of electrocardiogram
utilizarion.i" Lacking any obvious theoretical defects, both studies seem
quite compelling. Nevertheless, further consideration suggests at ieast one
possible deficiency: while many commentators have emphasized the causal
19 Greenwald, B., and Mueller, M., 'Medical Malpractice and Medical Costs', in Rotemberg, S.,
(ed.) The Economics ofMedical Malpractice, 1978, 68.
20 Reynolds, R., Rizzo, J., and Gonzalez, M., 'The Cost of Medical Professional Liability'
(1987) 257 Journal American Medical Association 2776, 2779.
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role of first party health insurance and fee-for-service reimbursement in the
growth of diagnostic testing, neither study adequately controls for differ-
ences in the capacity of physicians to pass on the costs of such tests to
health insurers. Cross-sectional data recognizing recent cost containment
measures, such as "the diagnostic-related group reimbursement (DRG)
system, or alternative delivery systems such as health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs) might well
overshadow the significance of liability variables.
Second, since the time of the first American 'malpractice crisis' in the
mid-1970s, several American and Canadian surveys have recorded changes
in practice patterns attributed by respondent physicians to the threat of
malpractice liability. 21 In addition to increased record-keeping and in-
creases in physician communication with both patients and other health care
professionals, a substantial percentage of respondents have attributed in-
creased diagnostic testing (e.g. amniocentesis and electronic fetal monitoring)
and the use of specific treatement procedures (e.g. Cesarian sections) to the
threat of civil liability . On the other hand, despite this tendency to attribute
specific practice changes to the liability environment, these surveys also
reveal that physician practice patterns are also strongly shaped both by
direct patient demand and by professional considerations including recom-
mendations from continuing medical education programmes, suggestions in
medical journals and communications from a specialty society or licensing
body. Consequently, this evidence tells us little about the marginal impact
of the malpractice system itself on physician care levels. Furthermore, such
surveys are likely to be biased in favour of attributing practice changes to
the liability system both in the selection of respondents and in the answers
provided: it is presumably those most concerned about medical malpractice
who take the time to return questionnaires, and their responses are. un-
doubtedly influenced by the very fact of being asked to comment on the
effect of medical malpractice on their practice.
Indeed, given the prevailing standard of customary practice for determin-
ing medical malpractice.F one might expect any liability effect to be slight,
except for physicians exercising less than customary care, or where custom-
ary practice is displaced by a judicially-determined standard of care (as in
some informed consent cases),23 or where (as with record-keeping) practice
changes are directed not at meeting the standard of care but at proving due
care in the event of a suit. Otherwise, so-called 'liability-induced' practice
changes are identical to those introduced for purely professional reasons.
Thus, while physician surveys suggest that civil liability has had some
effect on a variety of practice areas, one might reasonably conclude that its
21 See e.g. American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. Professional Liabilitv and
Effects. 1988; Dewees, D., Coyte, P., and Trebilcock, H. supra 3. .
22 See e.g. McHugh v. Audet 72 F. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947) Crits & Crits v. Sylvester
(1956) 1 D.L.R. (2d) 502, 508 (Ont. C.A.) affd [1956] S.C.R. 991.
23 See e.g. Canterbury v. Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Reibl v. Hughes (1980) 114
D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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impact has been greatest with respect to a variety of methods of record-
keeping and time spent with patients discussing the risks and benefits of
treatment. In contrast, while the legal standard of customary practice may
help to perpetuate questionable diagnostic and therapeutic practices,
empirical investigation seems to suggest that medical technological innova-
tion is driven more by profession-specific factors than by changes in the
medical-legal environment.e" It is not surprising, therefore, that Canada and
the United States recorded similar increases in their Cesarian birth rates in
the 1970s and early 1980s, despite considerable differences in each country's
liability climate at the time.25
Nevertheless, it is implausible to conclude in the face of such widespread
agreement among recent survey responses that the current liability environ--
ment has had no impact on the diagnostic and treatment procedures of a
substantial number of practising physicians. On the contrary, as one
commentator has remarked, 'where there is so much smoke, there must be
some fire. ,26 In fact, despite the prevailing customary practice standard,
there are at least four reasons why individual physicians might be led to
abandon professionally-justified practices in favour of a different set of
procedures motivated instead by a fear of malpractice liability. First,
customary medical practices are fluid and provisional, not stable and well-
defined. While liability rules guarantee immunity to a physician who
employs a technique followed by a 'respectable minority' of the profes-
sion,27 it is for the courts to determine exactly what minority remains
respectable.r" -Confronted with this uncertainty, it is easy to see why a
physician favouring a minority procedure on purely medical grounds might
nevertheless be led to abandon such a practice in favour of the majority
approach in order to minimize the risk of an adverse ruling.
Second, even where a practice is routinely followed by a majority of the
medical profession, the determination of actual claims is subject to the risk
of adjudicative error - a risk that is particularly acute where deliberative
authority rests in the hands of layperson judges and juries who are apt to
exaggerate the significance of professional options which, in light of
subsequent events, might have prevented the plaintiff's injury. In such a
context, an anxious physician could be well-advised to employ a variety of
procedures for the purpose of their signalling effect on prospective adjudi-
cators, rather than their diagnostic or therapeutic value. Moreover, to the
24 See e.g. Thacker, S. B., 'The Impact of Technology Assessment and Medical Malpractice on
the Diffusion of Medical Technologies: The Case of Electronic Fetal Monitoring', in Rostow, V.,
and Bulger, R., (eds) Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery ofObstetrical Care, Vol. II,
1989, 9-26.
25 Anderson, G., and Lomas, J., 'Determinants of the IncreasingCesarian Birth Rate', (1984) 31I
New England Journal ofMedicine 887.
26 Bell, P., 'Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts
About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability', (1984) 35 Syracuse Law Review 939, 971.
27 See e.g. Dahl v. Wagner 87 Wash. 492, 495 (1915); Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee [19571 All E.R. 118, 121 (Q.B.).
28 See e.g. Brain v. Mador (1985) 32 e.e.L.T. 157, 163 (Ont. C.A.).
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extent that laypersons embrace a highly technological conception of medi-
cal care (viewing technology as the means by which every physical malady
may ultimately be remedied), and to the extent that the traditional fee-for-
service reimbursement mechanism imposes few constraints on physicians'
abilities to order expensive technologically sophisticated procedures,
physicians are likely to respond with signals that satisfy precisely this
technological bias.
Third, even if courts were not as susceptible to error as at least one recent
study suggests they are,29 physicians might adopt medically unjustified
practices by reason of their unfamiliarity with applicable legal standards
and exaggerated fears of liability based on collegial anecdotes or media
reports of exceptional cases. 30 Indeed, in conjunction with' the traditional
fee-for-service system, such uncertainty provides a plausible account of the
widely-reported phenomenon of defensive medicine according to which
physicians tend to employ technologically sophisticated but non cost-
justified procedures with.a view to liability concerns rather than profession-
al considerations.3t
Finally, even if courts were perfectly accurate in their assessments of
liability and physicians were perfectly informed about applicable legal
standards, risk aversion would probably induce many physicians to adopt
excessive (non cost-justified) precautions to reduce the risk of malpractice
claims with their attendant costs of foregone income due to time taken out
of professional practice, emotional anxiety and reputational damage. In this
respect, the concept of risk aversion provides further support for the
hypothesis that individual physicians are more prone to engage in defensive
medicine than are institutional health care providers for whom liability costs
constitute a less variable risk of professional practice. 32
The third form of available evidence on the impact of the civil liability
system on the practice patterns of individual physicians consists of three
studies which have attempted to trace the effect on physician practice
patterns of a significant change in a given legal rule. For Wiley, studying
the impact of a landmark Washington decision (Helling v. Carey 33) that
disregarded medical custom to hold the defendant ophthalmologists liable
for failing to conduct routine glaucoma tests on a 32 year-old patient who
went blind, minor differences between practice changes in Washington and
in other states from which data was gathered suggest that the direct impact
of the ruling was negligible.P" On the other hand, Wiley's findings are also
29 Cheney, F., Posner, K., Kaplan, R., and Ward, R., 'Standard of Care and Anaeslhesia
Liability' (1989) 261 Journal American Medical Association 1599.
30 Bell, P., op. cit. 973-90. .
31 Chapman, B., 'Controlling the Costs of Medical Malpractice: An Argument for Strict Hospital
Liability' (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 523.
32 Ibid. 556-7.
33 Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 415 (1974).
34 Wiley, J., 'The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study
(1981) 55 Southern California Law Review 345, 361.
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consistent with a 'carryover effect' on physician practices in other states, or
with the hypothesis that the ruling's impact was muted by legislative
reversal of the decision the year after its pronouncement. Although' Wiley
rejects these theories, neither the reasons advanced nor the sample size
upon which his conclusions are based are convincing. Nevertheless, that
most physicians attributed increased glaucoma testing not to the Helling
decision, but to colleagues or the best interests of their patient suggests that
the court participated in an ongoing process of redefining customary'
practices, so that any independent impact of the ruling was. probably
minimal.
Surveying Canadian surgeons shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Reibl v. Hughes 35 (imposing more stringent conditions on the
defence of informed consent), Robertson expresses similar doubts regard-
ing the impact of the civil liability system on physicians' disclosure of
treatment risks." A year and an half after the landmark ruling, only 26 per
cent of respondents had heard of the case, and only 59 per cent of this group
cited any impact attributable to Reibl on their practice of informing patients
of risks. The majority of respondents (and 50 per cent of respondents aware
of the decision) continued to favour the pre-ReibL standard of risk disclo-
sure. Nevertheless that 59 per cent of those indicating an appreciation of the
decision rejected the pre-ReibL standard, and that more recent surveys
indicate noticeable increases in liability-induced patient communication,
suggest that the decision has indeed had the intended impact but that well-
established medical practices are slow to change.
In sharp contrast to Wiley's and Robertson's conclusions are those of
Givelber, Bowers and Blitch,3? reporting on the responses of American
mental health professionals to the California Supreme Court decision in
Tarasoffv. Regents ofthe University ojCaLijornia38 in which the defendant
was held liable for failing to take reasonable precautions to protect the
plaintiff from a violent psychiatric patient. While most incorrectly believed
that the case required them to warn the potential victim, this confusion is
understandable since a preliminary decision had in fact articulated a duty to
warn,"? and on the facts of the case, warning the potential victim was what
the court deemed necessary to satisfy the reasonable care standard. Further-
more, although roughly a third of respondents who considered themselves
legally bound by the decision reported increased note taking and reduced
willingness to treat potentially violent psychiatric patients as a result of the
decision, a much larger number indicated a greater willingness to hospi-
talize the patient (32-50 per cent), or to notify the police (39-50 per cent),
35 Reihl v. Hughes, (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1..
36 Robertson, G., 'Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study', (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal, 139, 160-1.
37 Givelber, G., Bowers W., and Blitch, C., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action' [19841 Wisconsin Law Review 443.
38 Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).
39 13 Cal. 3d 177 (1974).
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public authorities (47-61 per cent) and potential victims (56-75 per cent)-
precisely the sort of actions contemplated by the court. Thus, as ultimately
with Reihl, Tarasoff appears to have had the intended effect on the practice
patterns of health care professionals.
(ii) Institutions. Evidence on practice changes by health care institutions is
limited. In our survey, 23 of 30 Canadian hospitals reported always
or usually investigating or reviewing malpractice claims, despite being
typically insured for such claims; 18 reported that some claims had resulted
in changes to hospital policies and procedures.
More generally, although less well-documented, recent increases in
hospital premiums, the growth of hospital self-insurance plans, and the
expansion of hospital liability both in Canada and the United States have
been closely associated with the introduction of institutional quality assur-
ance and risk management programmes. While these programmes have also
been stimulated by government regulation, casual observation suggests that
their earlier emergence and more advanced form in the United States
reflects differences in the liability environment.
(b) Activity Levels
Activity level responses to the experience or threat of civil liability are of three
forms. First, liability concerns may stimulate medical practitioners to curtail or
discontinue high-risk practice areas. This result has been reported in a numberof
provider surveys.f" The data indicates a marked tendency to attribute to medical
malpractice both the reduction and elimination of specific practices, particularly
among obstetricians and gynaecologists, certified nurse-midwives (CNMs) and
.among general practitioners and family physicians who previously performed
obstetrical and prenatal care, anaesthesiology or emergency room services."! As
with changes in practice patterns, however, it is impossible to conclude from
these surveys that reported changes in practice scope are wholly attributable to
the civil liability system. Besides. the possibility of bias inherent in subjective
survey responses, the reasons for reported activity level responses are varied and
complex. Personal motives (changes in lifestyle and family reasons) generally
constitute the most significant reasons for changes in practice scope. In fact, age
profiles of those reporting the most changes in practice scope suggest total or
semi-retirement as their primary motive. Furthermore, considerations related to
respondents' practices (not enough cases per year, inadequate compensation,
competitive pressure, and growth in other areas of practice) often play a larger
role than liability concerns - although such 'practice' considerations may be
liability related to the extent that insurance costs affect medical fees (and patient
40 See e.g, Charles, S., Pyskoty, C.; and Nelson, A., 'Physicians on Trial - Self-Reported
Reac1ions to Malpractice Trials', [19881 Journal of Medicine 358; Lewis-Iderna, D., 'Medical
Professional Liability and Access to Obstetrical Care: Is There a Crisis?' in Rostow and Bulger, (eds)
Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care, Vol. II, supra 24, 78-96.
41 See e.g. Institute of Medicine, Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical
Care, Vol. I, 1989, 35-53.
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demand) or alter provider supply decisions. Finally, the rigidity of most
malpractice insurance policies - which typically fail to reflect -lower risks
associated with part-time practice or the performance of low-risk procedures by
CNMs and GP/FMs - makes it difficult to attribute any activity level responses
to the liability system per se as opposed to the structure of the liability insurance
regime. Nevertheless, that many physicians react strongly to the prospect or
experience of a malpractice suit regardless of its outcome and independent of any
perceived impact on malpractice premiums suggests that some changes in
practice scope may be motivated by the liability system directly rather than by
the liability insurance system.
A second reported activity level response involves physician decisions to .
relocate away from a highly litigious region to an area with lower claim
frequency and severity and lower malpractice premiums. According to surveys
taken at the height of the U.S. malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s, between 0.5
and 3.0 per cent of responding physicians had relocated at least in part because of
malpractice insurance problems.F On the other hand, two statistical analyses
have found no significant relationship between the malpractice environment and
physician location decisions.P While some marginal effect seems plausible,
particularly among high risk specialists whose premiums and exposure to
liability have increased enormously since these studies were conducted, liability
considerations are likely dwarfed by more conventional determinants of geo-
graphical location such as employment opportunities, relative salaries, climate,
and social/cultural attractions.
Finally, activity levels can be affected by the choices of new participants in the
market. Unfortunately, the evidence here is minimal. Looking at the distribution
of newly licensed U.S. physicians in 1974, Burghardt concludes that market
entrants 'do not appear to have been driven away from the crisis states. ,44 On the
other hand, recent evidence (much of it anecdotal) suggests that medical students
are choosing not to enter high risk fields like obstetrics, anaesthesiology and
orthopaedic care, and that family physicians who started practising in the 1980s
are much less likely to include obstetrics in their first year of practice than those
who began their practice earlier. According to the American Association of
Medical Colleges, for example, the percentage of fourth-year medical students
selecting obstetrical residencies fell from 8.8 in 1984 to 6.7 in 1987.45 In the
absence of more comprehensive econometric studies, however, it is difficult to
assess the validity of these assertions.
2.. The Impact ofPractice Changes on the Injury Rate
Whatever changes the civil liability system has generated in medical care and
activity levels, their final impact on the incidence of medical injuries remains
42 Law, S., and Polan, S., Pain and Profit: The Politics ofMalpractice, 1978,22-3.
43 Burghardt, G., Jr, 'Medical Malpractice and the Supply of Physicians' , in Rotenberg, op. cit.
119; Greenwald and Mueller, op. cit. 73.
44 Burghardt, op. cit. 122.
45 Cited in Institute of Medicine, Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery ofObstetrical
Care, Vol. I, op. cit. 36-7.
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uncertain. In the absence of detailed econometric studies, one can only speculate
on this ultimate effect on the basis of existing evidence linking the quality of
medical care to specific practices or categories of physicians.
(a) Care Levels
(i) Individuals
Documentation. Some commentators suggest that increased record-keeping
leads to better quality medical care.t" There are no studies to support this
opinion. While detailed medical records are invaluable for effective risk manage-
ment, documentation solely designed to pre-empt potential litigation increases
medical costs without any benefit to patients. Furthermore, the evidence that
does exist suggests that the critical element in medical care delivery is not the
recording of information, but the reliability with which a patient's history is
taken and physical findings are eliclted."? Consequently, to the extent that the
civil liability system has motivated physicians to record less pertinent informa-
tion or information designed primarily for evidentiary purposes in the event of
litigation, it appears to have provoked overdeterrence and 'defensive medicine'.
Patient Communication. Many studies have challenged the extent to which
patients actually desire information on treatment risks and alternatives, the
adequacy of physician disclosure and the ability of most patients to comprehend
and act rationally upon the information that they receive.f" Nevertheless, surveys
indicating the significance of patient demand in physician decisions to increase
patient communication suggest that the benefits of such disclosure, although
uncertain with respect to the medical injury rate, are no less real. Furthermore,
recent survey results suggest that changes in the law of informed consent have
had a noticeable impact on the manner in which physicians convey medical
information to patients. Here, it would seem, by rejecting customary practice
as the standard for disclosure, tort law has managed to play an effective role as
'ombudsman' .
Diagnosis and Treatment. The marginal benefits ofliability-induced diagnostic
and treatment procedures are considerably less certain. Recent evidence not only
calls into question justifications for increased utilization rates of technologically
sophisticated procedures such as electronic fetal monitoring (EFM), amniocen-
tesis, and Cesarian-sections, but suggests that these and others are sometimes
harmful to patients.f? While subjective assessments are inherently unreliable, to
the extent that physicians themselves report little medical justification for many
46 See e.g, McKerrow, L. W., 'Litigation and the Health Care Professional - Defensive
Medicine is not the Answer' (\983) 4 Health Law in Canada 35, 38.
47 Brook, R., Brutoco, R., and Williams, K. 'The RelationshipBetweenMedicalMalpracticeand
Quality of Care', (\975) Duke Law Journal, \197, 1221.
48 For a comprehensive and critical review of these studies, see Meisel, A., and Roth, L.,
'Toward an Informal Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical
Studies' (\983) 25 Arizona Law Review 265.
49 Institute of Medicine, Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care,
Vol. I., op. cit. 75-82.
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of the procedures adopted on the basis of liability concerns, it is reasonable to
suppose that the marginal effect of these practice changes on the rate of medical .
injuries is slight. '
On the other hand, we are not entirely convinced by physician arguments that
much increased testing is not necessary. For example, it has been argued that
routine fetal monitoring is unnecessary because it may only identify a problem
in, for example, one in a thousand cases. Yet if that monitoring prevents a
severely brain-damaged baby, with enormous attendant costs, the benefits of the
monitoring may outweigh the costs. Then again, detailed cost-benefit evalua-
tions are by no means so straightforward. Even if EFM were to pass a test of
'first-order' effects, second-order consequences might reverse the initial calcula-.
tion. For example, if as more than one study has suggested.P routine EFM leads
to a higher rate of Cesarian-sections, one would want to consider as well the
costs and benefits of this second-order effect. In this respect, it is worth noting
that while maternal mortality rates are comparable for both vaginal delivery and
Cesarian-section, the latter procedure has a significantly higher incidence of
morbidity (where this includes a higher rate of infection, longer hospitalization,
rarer complications such as hysterectomy and bowel trauma), as well as less
tangible drawbacks of women's loss of control and increased impediments to
maternal-infant bonding;" So too, one should consider evidence of, a $4,000-
$5,000 cost differential between vaginal delivery and Cesarian-section for
uncomplicated deliveries, and reports that even a five per cent reduction in the
rate of Cesarian-sections in the United States (currently at about 25 per cent of all
live deliveries) would generate health-care savings in the order of $800 million.52
Of course, a fundamental question about the liability system (to which we return
in the final section of this paper) is who is best placed to make these cost-benefit
evaluations.
Professional Interaction. To the extent that liability considerations encourage
physicians to study the professional literature more closely and to attend more
continuing education courses, one might anticipate a reduction in the incidence
of medical injuries. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is little evidence that
these activities alone have a meaningful impact on professional competence and
quality of care. Instead, most studies have concluded that effective practice
modification requires educational programmes to focus on identified problem
areas and to be aimed at specific behavioural changes. Furthermore, to the extent
that the professional literature studied and the educational programmes attended
are directed more toward litigation pre-emption techniques (such as detailed'
record-keeping) than at injury avoidance practices, patient benefits might be non-
existent. Increased consultation with other professionals seems beneficial, but
we are unaware of any studies assessing its impact on medical quality.
50 See e.g. Sachs, B., 'Is the Rising Rate of Cesarian Sections a Result of More Defensive
Medicine?' in Rostow and Bulger, (eds) op. cit. 31; Institute of Medicine, op. cit. 75.
51 Sachs, B., op. cit. 33-4.
52 Ibid. 36, 38.
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(ii) Institutions
There is little evidence relating risk management programmes to malpractice
claims experience or to the incidence of medical injuries. Nevertheless, many
successful experiments at improving the quality of medical care appear to have
been conducted within the organizational framework that is the touchstone of
institutional risk management. 53 Consequently, despite anecdotal evidence that
liability considerations have combined with rules of documentary disclosure to
impede physician participation in hospital quality assurance and risk manage-
ment committees." institutional liability seems likely to reduce the number of
medical injuries (an issue to which we return in the concluding section of the
paper).
(b) Activity Levels
The relationship between activity level responses and the incidence of medical
injuries is even harder to assess. Some commentators welcome increased liability
in high-risk areas as discouraging excessive use of expensive and invasive
diagnostic and surgical procedures.P Similarly, to the extent that quality of care
is inversely related to physician age and directly related to physician training and
specialization, early retirement and restrictions on the scope of GPIFM practices
may produce welcome reductions in the number of medical injuries. With respect
to GP/FMs at least, this interpretation is supported by evidence that many such
physicians have also experienced difficulty in obtaining hospital privileges in
obstetrical and surgical areas of patient care;56thus, sound medical reasons may
justify their exclusion from high-risk practice areas.
Other evidence, however, suggests a potentially detrimental aspect to reported
activity level responses. More than one survey reveals a marked tendency for
many physicians to reject certain patients not on the grounds of medical
complexity, but instead solely because they display indications of potential
litigiousness.57 Thus, as one group of researchers concludes: 'for an as yet
undefined group of patients, access to health care may be becoming restricted
because of factors associated with malpractice litigation. ,58 So too, increases in
53 See e.g. Eichorn, J., Cooper, J., Cullen, D.• Maier, W., Philip, J., and Seeman, R. 'Standards
for Patient Monitoring During Anaesthesia at Harvard Medical School', (1986) 256 Journal
American Medical Association 1017;Chassin, M., and McCue, S., 'A Randomized Trial of Medical
Quality Assurance', (1986) 256 Journal American Medical Association 1012; Myers, S., and
Gleicher, N. 'Successful Program to Lower Cesarian-Section Rates', (1988) 319 New England
Journal ofMedicine 151!.
54 See Duff, D. G., 'Evidentiary Privilege for Hospital Quality Assurance and Risk Management:
Assessing Statutory Reform (1989) University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 526,536-8.
55 Brook, Brutoco and Williams, op. cit. 1211.
56 Weiss, B., 'Hospital Privileges for Family Physicians at University Hospitals', (1984) 18.
Journal of Family Practice 747.
57 Charles, S., Wilbert, J., and Franke, K., 'Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported
Reactions to Malpractice Litigation', (1985) 142 American Journal ofPsychiatry 437,440; Peters,
D., Nord, S., and Woodson, R.D., 'An Empirical Analysis of the Medical and Legal Professions'
Experiences and Perceptions of Medical and Legal Malpractice,' (1986) 19Michigan Journal ofLaw
Reform 601, 616.
58 Charles, Wilbert and Franke, op. cit. 440.
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the volume of technologically intensive diagnostic and therapeutic interventions,
and reports of diminished accessibility to obstetrical services, raise doubts about _
the current allocation of medical resources. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
determine the extent to which the liability system itself is responsible for these
allocative characteristics, and difficult to defme optimal tradeoffs between
improved quality and enhanced access. These issues call for a comparative
evaluation of all the available policy instruments to achieve improvements in
public health status and for a difficult social calculus as to whether patients are
better or worse off with less ready access to more specialized practitioners
compared to readier access to physicians with a somewhat more disparate range-
of expertise. We have not seen a convincing evaluation of these issues, nor can
we offer one of our own.
3. The Costs of the Civil Liability System
Whatever benefits the civil liability system generates in terms of reduced
injury costs, optimal deterrence requires that these savings exceed the costs
incurred in preventing those injuries. Consequently, a thorough analysis of
the deterrence properties of the medical malpractice system requires both the
identification and estimation of accident prevention costs.
One approach to this task involves econometric studies relating malpractice
premium increases (serving as a proxy for exposure to malpractice liability) to
reported increases in aggregate physician fees and hospital expenditures. On this
basis, Greenwald and Mueller conclude that the 400 per cent rise in U.S.
malpractice premiums between 1970 and 1975 added $2.3 billion to health care
expenditures over the same period. 59 Working with 1984 data, Reynolds, Rizzo-
and Gonzalez estimate the total cost of liability-induced practices in the United
States for that year (both care and activity level changes) at between $8.4 and
$12.1 billion. 6O Since these studies fail to account for differences in health care
reimbursement mechanisms, however, they are likely to overstate the impact of
liability alone on health care costs.
Similarly, since physician surveys are likely to exaggerate the extent of purely
liability-induced practice changes, attempts to estimate the total cost of such
practices by aggregating the estimated price of reported changes over all
physicians also inflates the total costs of specifically liability-related practices.
Nevertheless, this method has yielded two U.S. estimates of about $10.6 billion
annually.v' and between $15 billion and $40 billion per year.62
On the other hand, both econometric and survey techniques of measuring the
costs of the civil liability system fail to account for additional expenses that
59 Greenwald and Mueller, op. cit. 83.
60 Reynolds, Rizzo and Gonzalez, op. cit. 2780.
61 Ibid. 2778.
62 American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance,
Professional Liability in the I980s (1984), cited in Weiler, op. cit. 157-8.
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should properly be included in measuring the deterrence costs of the current
medical malpractice system. First, in addition to the price of 'positive' practice
changes attributed to the civil liability system, a comprehensive accounting
should also consider the costs of 'negative' practice responses, involving
restricted accessibility, impediments to medical innovation, and reluctant partici-
pation in quality assurance and risk management programmes. No studies have
attempted to measure these costs. Second, the administrative 'transactions costs'
of establishing legal incentives for the prevention of injuries should also be
considered. These include the private costs of defending and litigating malprac-
tice claims (totalling about 60 per cent of the $3 billion devoted to malpractice
premiums in the United States in 1984,63 plus about $50 million paid to attorneys
employed directly by defendants as opposed to their insurers'"), the foregone
income of physicians who lose an average of 2.7 days per malpractice claim filed
against them (totalling about $70 million in the U.S. in 198465), and the public
costs of providing courts, judges and/or juries to resolve malpractice claims
(amounting to about $3.7 million per year in the United States'"). Finally, since
many studies have documented the emotional trauma experienced by individual
physicians sued for malpractice (regardless of the outcome), some estimate of the
price that physicians would be willing to pay to avoid this experience should also
be included as a cost of injury prevention through the current malpractice system.
Weare unaware of any attempt to measure this cost.
4. Conclusion
While existing studies indicate some impact of civil liability on medical
practice, inadequate evidence on both the costs and benefits of liability-induced
changes in medical practice, and on the precise character of those changes
themselves makes it impossible to reach firm conclusions regarding the operation
of the medical malpractice system as a mechanism for deterring medical injuries.
Whether the system actually stimulates cost-justified injury prevention is impos-
sible to determine from the existing data. Nevertheless, even this limited
evidence suggests two areas where the civil liability system may have had a
noticeable impact, and where the benefits of these practice changes probably
outweigh the costs: physician communication of treatment risks and alternatives
to patients, and institutional programmes for injury prevention.
63 Reynolds, Rizzo and Gonzalez, op. cit. 2778; Weiler, op. cit. 129.
64 Calculated from figures presented in Reynolds, Rizzo and Gonzalez, op. cit. 2778; and U.S.
Congress General Accounting Office (G.A.D.), Medical Malpractice; Characteristics of Claims
Closed in 1984, 1987,26.
65 Calculated from data found in Zuckerman, S., 'Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs and
the Practice of Defensive Medicine', (1984) 3 Health Affairs 128, 130-1; and G.A.D., op. cit: 26.
66 Calculated from estimates presented in Danzon, supra n.I, 31; G.A.D., op. cit. 22; Kakalik,
S. S., and Ross, R. L., Costs of the Civil Justice System: Court Expenditures on Various Types of
Civil Cases, 1983, 65.
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V ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE QUALITY CONTROL ISSUE
I. Administrative Oversight
Traditionally, the principal regulatory form of post-entry quality control has
been the disciplinary processes of the self-governing institutions of the medical
profession. However, the disciplinary process appears to address rather different
behaviour from that addressed by the tort system. For example, Danzon'" reports
that despite 1,500 paid malpractice claims in California in 197? only six
disciplinary actions for incompetence or gross negligence occurred in that year.
Weiler68 reports that even after marked increases in disciplinary actions in the
U.S. over the past decade or so, by the mid-1980s there were only about 1,000
instances of probation, supervision and licence revocation per year across the
entire country - around 400 losses of licence in a physician population of about
400,000, compared to about 35,000 paid malpractice claims a year and a much
larger number of negligently caused medical injuries which are not litigated for
one reason or another. Despite dramatic increases in claims rates, a recent U.S.
study found that only one in eight negligently-caused medical injuries results in
claims and only one in sixteen results in paid claims.P? Moreover, most serious
disciplinary actions related to behaviour such as improper drug prescriptions,
alcohol or drug abuse, sexual misconduct with patients etc., rather than for
substandard practice.??
Our own recent analysis of the interface between the tort system and the
disciplinary activities of Canadian provincial colleges of physicians and surgeons
tends to support the conclusions drawn from the U.S. analysis. While limited
data is available in Canada, all provincial colleges provided us with information
that yields some clues as to this interaction. The responding bodies indicated that
it was extremely rare for a civil lawsuit to give rise to an investigation, and most _
said it never happened. Sources of information relied on in initiating investiga-
tions included patients, relatives and friends, other physicians, hospitals, and a
mix of minor sources.
The disciplinary bodies of provincial colleges of physicians and surgeons
appear to devote a substantial part of their resources to investigating and
adjudicating allegations unrelated to negligence or incompetence. Data from the
provincial colleges for 1983-1987 indicates that 69.8 per cent of Canadian
disciplinary cases which result in sanctions involve allegations other than
negligence or incompetence; while 22.9 per cent involve negligence and 7.3 per
cent involve incompetence. Thus existing disciplinary mechanisms appear to
have very little overlap with the tort system.
Moreover, the number of physicians who are disciplined for negligence or for
67 Danzon, P. M. 'The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims' (1984) 27 Journal
ofLaw and Economics 115.
68 Weiler, op. cit.
69 Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients. Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury. Malpractice
Litigation. and Patient Compensation in New York (1990).
70 Ibid. 209-10.
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incompetence seems to be quite low compared with the number of settlements
and awards for medical malpractice. The.total number of physicians disciplined
in Canada during 1983-1987 for negligence and/or incompetence was between
98 and 174, and likely was closer to the former than to the latter. During 1983-
1987, plaintiffs received payments in respect of 916 malpractice lawsuits against
CMPA-defended physicians '(840 out-of-court settlements, plus 76 awards at
trial). Thus, relative to the number of physicians in respect of whom payments
were made to plaintiffs in malpractice actions, the number of physicians formally
sanctioned for negligence or for incompetence appears to be between 10.7 per
cent and 19.0 per cent (but is likely closer to the former). As a percentage of all
incidents of negligently-caused iatrogenic injury, this ratio is much lower again.
Hence, if, for example, a no-fault compensation system were to supplant tort
law for medical misadventures, existing disciplinary mechanisms - if operating
as they currently appear to do - would fail substantially to fill whatever
deterrence role tort law might otherwise play. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize
existing disciplinary processes on this basis, since they are not designed to
function as a shadow tort system. Indeed, as noted above, the large malpractice
claims data reveals very little evidence of recidivism - recurrent or chronic
defaults in performance - which might be thought to warrant the traditional
disciplinary sanctions of suspension or revocation of licence. However, it can be
persuasively argued that the post-entry quality control mechanisms of the self-
governing bodies of the medical profession should be much more broadly
conceived, e.g., practice guidelines, practice audits, practice limits, remedial
retraining, etc., and assume a more pro-active, rehabilitative orientation.I'
Legislative reforms might well be directed to ensuring that the self-governing
institutions of the medical profession have the powers and the impetus to take
this expanded quality-control role seriously.
2. Institutional Liability
In addition to are-orientation of the administrative mechanisms.of the medical
profession directed to monitoring and enhancing post-entry care and competence
of physicians, proposals have recently been advanced for reconstituting the tort
system as a quality control mechanism by focussing its incentives on the
institutions within whose precincts medical treatments giving rise to malpractice
claims occur.F Both U.S. and Canadian evidence suggests that about 90 per cent
of all medical malpractice claims arise out of hospital treatments. However,
because of the independent contractor rule, hospitals are not generally liable for
the negligence of independent, non-employee physicians who treat their patients
in hospital settings pursuant to privileges granted by the admitting hospital.
The argument for substituting institutional liability for individual physician
liability, perhaps with limited rights of indemnification in cases of gross
71 See Trebilcock, M. J., Tuohy, C. J., and Wolfson, A. D., Professional Regulation, (1979)
ch. 1J.
72 Weiler, op. cit. s. VIII(d); Chapman, op. cit.
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physician negligence, is that the goal of optimal accident reduction is likely to be
advanced in the following ways: (a) because of the law of large numbers,
hospitals are less likely than individual physicians to adopt excessive precautions'
due to risk aversion, and more sensitive forms of experience-rating of insurance
premiums are likely to emerge at the institutional level than at the individual
physician level; (b) budget constrained hospitals will have less of an incentive to
promote socially wasteful forms of 'defensive' medicine than individual
physicians; (c) due to economies of scale, one would expect institutional
providers to be more familiar with applicable legal standards than individual'
physicians, and thus less likely to engage in defensive practices motivated by
exaggerated fears of liability; (d) hospital managements are likely to have a
broader and more intimate appreciation than individual physicians and their
insurers of systemic deficiencies that permit the occurrence of an excessive
incidence of human failures, and of the potential for corrective adaptations
of these systems, including systems for conferring, pricing, and terminating
hospital privileges; (e) institutional providers are likely to be better placed to
make the difficult cost-benefit calculations involved in the selection of available
medical procedures.
With an expanded, more pro-active, rehabilitative focus assigned to the post-
entry competence enhancement mechanisms of the medical profession, and a
redirected focus for the tort system that would substitute institutional liability for
individual physician liability for medical misadventures occurring within hospi- .
tal precincts, it is possible that socially less ambiguous enhancements in the
quality of health could be realized than from the present system of post-entry
quality control that rests so heavily on individual physician civil liability. In both
cases, more effective harnessing of expert institutions as 'gatekeepers' - the
self-governing institutions of the medical profession in terms of administrative
over-sight and' regulation, and hospitals in terms of civil liability ~ is the
unifying policy premise.
3. Technological Development
If, as we believe, Grady is correct that the increasing complexity of medical
practice and technology is a significant factor in the increase in medical
malpractice liability, there is an important implication for. the direction of
technological development. It appears that a major objective of medical develop-
ment has been to develop procedures and equipment that can save lives and
reduce dysfunction. Once one recognizes that it is not uncommon for errors to
occur in medical diagnosis and treatment, an additional important objective may
be defmed; rendering procedures and technology more forgiving of physician
error. Grady notes that the present malpractice system in the U.S. creates strong
incentives to develop such risk reducing technology; indeed he worries that this
incentive may be excessive. We can see in other areas, however, that the
development of technology that is forgiving of known human frailties can have
benefits that outweigh the costs and that the inducement of such development is
not left to the tort system alone. Three decades of improvements in the
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crashworthiness of automobiles, including seat belts, air bags, side guard door
beams, padded dashes, and redundant braking systems appear to have signifi-
cantly reduced the human carnage resulting from automobile accidents. While
most accidents may be the result of driver error, we have had limited success
with programs designed to eliminate those errors, while the crashworthiness
programs appear to have proven cost-effective.P Significantly, many of these
improvements have resulted directly from government regulation; many activ-
ities of NHTSA.reflect a belief, supported by some evidence, that the tort system
did not create incentives for the incorporation of cost effective crash-worthiness
features in automobiles. Aircraft have also incorporated increasingly sophisticated
systems that operate the aircraft (the auto-pilot) and that warn of system
malfunctions or dangerous conditions caused by pilot error. In the fields of motor
vehicle accidents, product accidents and occupational accidents, the tort system
has been supplemented by systems of government regulation, some of which
deal with risks caused by human inadvertence, and while many have criticized
the excesses of the regulatory agencies, most critics favour reform rather than
abolition of the regulatory system. We believe that it is worth studying whether
one could devise an institution with a mandate for assessing trends in medical
malpractice claims, and recommending modifications in both practice and
technology that would be cost-effective in reducing the risks that have driven the
dramatic liability increase of the 1970s and 1980s.
73 SeeFriedland, M. L., Trebilcock, M.J., and Roach, K. Regulating TrafficSafety (forthcoming).
